Tightening the Screws: Autonomy, Collective Action, and Violence in Puerto Real During the Second Shipbuilding Restructuring

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ABSTRACT
In 1982, the Spanish government passed the Shipbuilding Industry Restructuring Act. In the mid-1980s, conflicts occurred at shipyards throughout the Spanish state. This article focuses on workers’ resistance to shipbuilding restructuring in the shipyard of Puerto Real (Cádiz, Spain). We discuss the causes behind the singularity of this episode of workers resistance to restructuring in Puerto Real during the 1980s, which stands out because of the size of the conflict and the radicalism of its collective action. We also explore social perceptions of violence among the parties involved in the protest and analyze the different trade union models involved in the conflict. We conclude that there is a strong relationship between the autonomy of workers’ structures and the radicalism of their methods of collective action. [Keywords: Trade unionism, workers’ autonomy, violence, collective action, shipbuilding restructuring, shipyard, Spain]
Introduction: The Shipbuilding Restructuring at the Puerto Real Shipyard

There’s nothing left for us here.
Come on! To the bridge! Let’s go!

This is the expression that an old trade union man used to express the spirit with which workers from the Puerto Real shipyard moved to cut off traffic between the city of Cádiz and the rest of the province. In the 1980s, workers were protesting the restructuring of the shipbuilding sector in Spain, which had a particularly strong impact on the Bay of Cádiz, in Andalusia (southern Spain).

The Puerto Real yard stood out in its opposition to the restructuring process. In 1982, the Spanish government passed the second decree for restructuring the shipbuilding industry. The aim of the decree was to reorganize this industry to help it adapt to the European Community requirements. This reorganization required that factories be shut down and workers be discharged all over the country, but the decree did not specify which yards and workers would be affected. Protests and negotiations abounded throughout the country until 1984, when the employers, the Spanish government, and the unions (UGT—the socialist General Workers Union—and ELA-STV—Euskal Langileen Alkartasuna, Basque Workers Solidarity) signed a basic plan outlining how to implement restructuring. Another major union, CCOO (the Communist Workers Commission), and a regional union, CIGA (the Galician Inter-Union Confederation), refused to sign.

On January 1, 1986, Spain entered the European Community. This step required its complete political and economic integration into capitalist Europe, which was established after World War II. Until then, Spain had been politically excluded for having a dictatorship that was regarded as totalitarian by the UN. The Spanish economy, in which the state had strongly intervened since the 1950s, was not entirely integrated into the economic system of the current European Union. Spanish industry had to adapt to the new economic situation, strongly affecting agriculture and industry. Several sectors, including shipbuilding, underwent difficult processes of restructuring. The shipbuilding sector, moreover, had faced a crisis throughout the 1980s. Since the beginning of the sector’s expansion in the 1950s, Spain had become the fourth most important shipbuilder in the world. Entering the EC entailed reducing the generous state
subsidies to the shipbuilding sector and opening a market that had been closed. The efforts to restructure the iron and steel and the shipbuilding industries constituted the “hard core” of the diverse restructuring processes of those years. Restructuring of the shipbuilding sector had actually begun years before. The VI Communitarian Act, legislation which outlined the economic restructuring, was set to expire in 1990, the year in which integration would be complete.

Shipbuilding restructuring was a sea change in Spanish history, signifying the transition of the world economic order from an industrial to a post-industrial economic model. The process completely changed the way in which work was structured (Cohen 2007) and replaced the scientific management of the system (Taylorism) with a new model characterized by flexibility and adaptability to demand. It must be noted that industrial intensification did not occur in Spain until later than other European countries, between the 1960s and 1970s, because of economic reforms of the so-called development plans that the Francoist Regime undertook to adapt the country to industrialization processes. When this change was complete, the transition to a post-industrial model was already underway in Europe and other “developed” countries.

Two influential events in Spain should be noted: the political, economic, and social changes following the death of General Francisco Franco (1939-1975) and negotiations for entry into the European Economic Community. The first of these required the remodeling of the Spanish political and institutional framework, including the way trade unions were organized and behaved (Carmona Pascual 2005). In contrast with other countries, the emerging Spanish labor relations system allowed various unions to intervene in the same workplaces. The process was complex, with several co-existing political orientations, including extreme views on both the left and the right, which had to be controlled and kept isolated from the state and corporate agencies. For instance, the nascent democracy had to prevent the workers and their social movement, which contested the economic and political foundations of the new capitalist order, from spreading.

The second of the two processes meant that Spain was immersed in far-reaching economic dynamics. One example of the implications of this process is the transformation of the developmentist production model of the latter-day Franco era into a new model defined by a shift to a service economy, with the outsourcing of activities, capital, and labor. This crisis was not purely the result of an endogenous evolution, as it was also linked
to the integration of Spain into the European Community and the role that was assigned to it in the new political economy; the most important elements include tourism and associated services and the real estate industry (Moreno 2002, Delgado 2002).

As a result, a variety of production activities that had received extensive support under Franco’s plans for industrialization, including shipbuilding, gradually became marginalized (Carmona Pascual 2005). In the Bay of Cádiz, the restructuring process first affected the Cádiz shipyard and then affected the yard at Puerto Real. The budding formal Spanish democratic administration executed extensive changes that led to the destruction of the industrial and employment markets. One of the administration’s main challenges was to channel social tension and manage the crisis.

Unions were one of the institutions that acted in response to these changes. The trade union arena was divided between those entities that accepted the transition organized and controlled by the state apparatus (“state trade unionism”) and a well-established minority that aimed to undermine the political-economic foundations of capitalism in the form of a democratic system using radical strategies. The latter were the independents, the so-called *lucha autónoma* (“Social Struggle”) groups that had sprung up in the 1960s during the latter part of the Franco administration (Espai en Blanc 2008) as an autonomist, unionized political movement. Their strikes and protests had few or no links with political and union organizations, which remained banned, and were characterized by anti-Francoism and anticapitalism.¹ That is, their aims and demands concerned both politics and the rights of workers (Torres 1998, Quintana 2002). They existed alongside what would eventually become the large state union organizations, which were more inclined toward bargaining and making deals and had predominantly centralized Works Committee structures (Ventura 2004).²

The Puerto Real workers’ movement walked a middle line between state trade unionism and the luchas autónomas. The state union model was represented at the shipyard by CCOO and UGT. There were, however, two other unions that wielded major influence: CAT (the Autonomous Workers Collective)³ and CNT (the National Employment Confederation). Broadly speaking, CAT adhered to the majority union model because they took part in Works Committees and shop floor elections. CNT was mainly responsible for the autonomist and anarcho-syndicalism overtones of workers’ resistance at Puerto Real. CNT rejected outright the dominant
union system and strove for assemblies to become sovereign organizations. They therefore fought for direct action by workers, grassroots democracy, and assemblies (Carmona Pascual 2005, Gómez Casas 1984, Ibáñez 2007). The political actions described herein are linked to this model of opposition to the system, which withstood co-optation by the state and which, by means of internally organized strategy and methodology and collective action, stood out for its public presence and ability to organize public protests (López Petit 2008:21).

This period of workers’ struggle can be understood as a violent response to the restructuring of the shipbuilding industry. The work culture at the shipyard was founded in the personalization of social and labor relations, in worker solidarity, in the handing down of skills and know-how, and in forms of worker control. The workers and some of the unions—those that defended the self-management model and direct involvement—rose up to save the activity on which their life experience pivoted, both in the yard and outside it (Ferruelo Magán 1999). The shipyards’ social and territorial production model was based on close-knit settlements: urban environments that performed highly specialized activities upon which many industrial activities depended. Therefore, restructuring was not just the dismantling of a sector in crisis, but the disappearance of an organizational model that had been molded for over a century and that affected the way of life of workers and their families. The shipyard was characterized by guild-like kinship, with a built-in social support system, and workers and their families had partial access not only to work but also to housing, training, and even some basic services. This way of life was engrained in the memories of the actors in the conflict of the 1980s (and in those of their ancestors, most of whom also worked for the company) to such a degree that restructuring could be called the dismantling of a community and a lifestyle, a whole world, limited in scope but with a long history.

In 1986, some of the workers on rotation at the yard, i.e., workers who were being paid some of their wages but not working, decided to go to the yard to show their willingness to maintain their working relationship with the yard’s managers. In January 1987, the demonstrations began, and the bridge into Cádiz was barricaded during a visit by the heir to the Spanish throne. This was the beginning of a series of weekly protests—at the yard on Tuesdays and in the town of Puerto Real on Thursdays—that lasted five months. During this time, clashes with the police escalated until, on May 28, the Works Committee and the management reached an
agreement, dubbed the “Jerez Accords,” that brought the protests to an end. However, some protests occurred at a later date to demand that the agreement be followed.

The 1987 Puerto Real incident was chosen for analysis because of its ramifications—as it spread to the townspeople and extended beyond the workplace—for the heated confrontation between the workers and the political, legal, and even trade union institutions, and for the virulence of the actions and the systematic use of violence by both sides. Even today, more than two decades later, these events endure in the collective memory of the inhabitants of Puerto Real and nearby municipalities.

The fieldwork for this article was conducted from February to December of 2008. We collected and analyzed about 5,000 documents, including union leaflets, photographs, meeting minutes, government plans, and stories from local and national newspapers of that period (e.g., Diario de Cádiz, El País, Diario 16, Interviú, and Solidaridad Obrera). We also interviewed 20 workers and trade union officials of different ages who worked in different occupations and were affiliated with various labor organizations (CCOO, UGT, CAT, and CNT).

Violence and Collective Action: Socio-Economic, Political, and Communicative Aspects

Sidney Tarrow’s (1998) concept of “contentious collective action” can be applied to this episode. As Tarrow points out: “contentious collective action is the basis for the social movements, not because the social movements are always violent or extreme, but it is the main and often the only recourse that ordinary people possess against better-equipped opponents or powerful states” (1998:4). Although we recognize Tarrow’s important contribution to social movement theory, his model-oriented frame represents social movements as rational artifacts created to pursue conventional fixed goals. Other approaches envision movements as social spaces of creation of and internal struggle over discourses, identities, and strategies. This view derives from another methodological perspective that considers social movements in their own terms and researches them from within (Graeber 2009, Juris 2008). As we will attempt to demonstrate, understanding the analyzed episode requires taking into account, on the one hand, the weight of work cultures and social identities generated in the shipyard, the city, and the social networks created over approximately
a century. On the other hand, the analysis must consider the controversial trade union arena at the beginning of representative democracy in Spain, in which the proposals of those organizations that accepted the social agreement and consensus imposed at the end of Francoism clashed with the ideas of those who pursued a deeper change in the political and economic foundations of the dictatorship and regarded the institutional reorganization that began in the so-called Transition as insufficient. The two kinds of organizations also pursued very different methods of action.

Violence is one of the key theoretical and practical problems associated with collective action. Tilly (1978, 2003) conceptualized violence as a specific mode of political action for “claiming one’s rights that are subject to processes of change and modernisation similar to what can be seen in other areas of social history” (as quoted in González Calleja 2002). These processes are linked to the dynamics over time in different countries and to deepening the socio-economic, political, and cultural bases of capitalism, and they constitute our focus in this article. This approach requires the notion of violence to be examined in the light of conflict (Aróstegui 1994) or, rather, in the light of the conflicts that local societies like Puerto Real experience when the mechanisms of social reproduction that had been valid until that moment enter into a crisis. Such was the case of the shipyard’s production system, on which a large part of local life was centered. Our position separates our argument from those that relate the outbreak of violence to the weakness of civil society in such a way that strengthening society would imply a decrease in the incidence of political violence (Keane 2000). The present case involves a widespread conflict related to the framework of the new political economy of newly democratic Spain, characterized by different ways of accumulating capital.

At the same time, we also approach the demands of the shipyard workers and the use of violent acts by the workers, security forces, and state police with a constructivist focus. In this way, we consider the “social process by which ‘violent action’ is typified and construed” (García Blanco 2007:162). That is, we adopt the view of Tarrow (1998), according to which social groups are capable of generating movements of political conflict against those in power when they are able to mobilize social networks, learn from models of social experiences, and direct their cultural models towards political action. However, it is important to consider the internal dissensions and changing and ambiguous relations between activists and
the agents with whom they negotiated—state spokespersons, company representatives, and the civil society in which the protest occurs.

Adopting this perspective requires differentiating agents from social communication. That is, those who control the media and discourse through which social implications are spread must be differentiated from those who receive these implications and are capable of organizing both discursive and factual responses through words and deeds. In this case, the communication process via which the responsibility for violent acts was attributed was controlled by the media, which expressed, in no uncertain terms, the position of one of the parties in the conflict, the state. The relationship between the union activists, the workers and their families, and the violence was therefore made a necessary part of social discourse. The characteristic feature of violence is that “it is inevitably attributed to an actor and his intentions” (García Blanco 2007:164).

Following Tilly once more, it is not so much the nature of the activity that confers upon it the condition of violence. For example, street fighting involves a whole assemblage of actions and reactions that are triggered particularly as a result of state action, which sparks political violence (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2005). Assuming this position does not entail accepting that the workers’ role was purely reactive per se. The initiative to move from words to deeds was theirs and theirs alone, the result of a strategic process and some demands that, in their most radical forms and with anti-system objectives, made sense in their historical framework. This same framework provided them with references, models, and precedents, such as the self-management struggle. Neither should it be overlooked that, as has already been stated, the shipbuilders formed a social, political, and symbolic fabric with deep historical roots. As such, the restructuring of the shipbuilding industry constituted a change in the existential horizon established by the agents of economic and political power. The workers’ and their families’ very social identity was at stake. Thus, following Coser (1956) it can be stated that the identity function could be found in the struggle at Puerto Real. Every action and protest added to the collective self-assertion of the workers and their social environment.

From the mid-1980s, the incorporation of the interest on culture in the specialized literature on social movements brought a new perspective which took into account three kinds of factors to understand the nature and depth of collective action: the structure of political opportunities, mobilizing structures and collective processes, and social interpretation and
construction (cultural framings) (McAdam et al. 1996). As we will attempt to demonstrate, the analyzed case can be valued under this synthetic perspective, which takes into account political opportunity and structural and ideological factors. In other words, this episode of worker struggle contains several processes which are identified as these kinds of factors. Thereby, 1) there was a shift in political economy (the shipbuilding crisis and the end of the Fordist industrial model), complicated by the transition from a dictatorship to a fragile and new democracy; 2) the actors in the struggle relied on the self-managed mobilizing models from the political transition, as well as on factory sociability networks; and, finally, 3) the actors (trade-unions, workers, and families) succeeded in building a collective imaginary in which their lifestyles could be identified with local society, shaping a worldview.

Figure 1: Contentious action in Puerto Real according to Social Movements Theory.
about their immediate reality and themselves which promoted collective action and guaranteed the spread and triumph of the protest (Figure 1).

Thus, it is from this angle that we analyze and interpret the workers’ protests, in which they managed to involve a large part of the local society and which, from momentary acts, became drawn out over a period of months. As other authors have pointed out (Aya 1995, Tilly 1978), episodes of violent social protest are related to the breaking of the pre-existing social contract. In Puerto Real, not only was a contract that had been valid for several generations called into question, but a comprehensive social fabric was also, so possibilities of everyday life at the micro level were connected with political economy transformations at the macro level. But it is also essential that actors mobilized ideological and axiological constellations which drove them to struggle and take part in the rebellion process (Snow 2004, Snow and Benford 1988, McAdam 1994). Given these circumstances, the shift from communication to action—García Blanco’s (2007) definition of violence—was to be expected by means of a dramatization of violence, which amplified the message through society and became reasonable as the call for rebellion. In this case, shipyard work cultures also provided most of the population with a repository of memories which constituted a cognitive and emotional tradition that acted as a shared reference framework.

For the workers and their families, fighting was a type of strategic political action by which they pursued concrete objectives, in which their own means, resources, knowledge, and capacity for organization were all valid (Aya 1995:108). The opportunity for fighting was measured by the existence of alliances of power or by the weakness of the government position. For Aya, forms of protest are programs for collective action that have standard operating procedures. The development of protests at shipbuilding yards in the Bay of Cádiz and other parts of Spain throughout history shows the creation of a method that is repeated cyclically, with new elements introduced that draw on the experience accumulated in previous protests, local culture, and the movement’s internal struggles. In the revolt’s immediate environment—in the historical moment of the birth of the parliamentary system at the beginning of the 1980s—radical union struggles, in which leftist political and social movements aimed to subvert the basis of capitalism and the state, may have been influential. Moreover, the fact that the shipyard work cultures offered a cultural reference framework for most local inhabitants is a key issue to understand
the movement’s emergence, maintenance, and radicalism (Benford and Snow 2000, Zald 1996).

We start from the supposition that violence cannot be defined from a positivist notion, as Gurr and Graham (1969) argue. That is, it is not possible to label certain facts as “violent,” “brutal,” or “rough” without regarding the interpretations of the actors involved. On the contrary, acts of violence must be related to the subjective assessments and meanings of the actors who perpetrate them, both in the praxis of their violence and in their communication regarding the facts. The reason for this stems from attempts at a definition or classification concealing any assessment, even implicitly. As Yves Michaud (1978:15) states, “the positivist definition of violence cannot hope to be objective by placing itself above assessments.” A vicious circle is therefore created between factual violence and the representation of this violence, especially when what is sought is an outside approach to the conflict itself, as is usually the case in academic research.

One of the consequences of adopting this perspective is that the way in which the violence is portrayed in the media becomes important. A conflict riddled with violent actions does not come down to those acts alone, but is also conveyed through discourse. By making strategic use of mechanisms involved in a violent struggle, collective action becomes a political action that gains its full meaning in the media. Thus, the violence originates a conflict of discourse. In our case, the agencies of the state and the platforms of media opinion—the dominant discourses—describe the violent acts of workers as something that should be completely rejected out of hand, as noncompliant with legal stipulations or social logic. However, this discourse created paradoxical effects. When the Civil Governor referred to the workers as terrorists in the local press while placing them in the sights of public opinion to discredit them, he gave their protest actions full meaning. For this reason, on the analytical level, it makes sense to separate factual violence from represented violence and experienced violence from visualized violence (Benford and Snow 2000, Imbert 1992:12).

The Battle of Puerto Real: From the First Incidents to the Spread of the Conflict through Society

Despite the measures taken in the 1984 restructuring, the shipyard at Puerto Real built no more new ships. During the following three years, the workshops remained closed because of a lack of work. The workers
remarked that “there wasn’t any iron for them to lay their hands on.” At the end of 1985, the yard’s order book was empty, and over 2,500 of its workers were made redundant and spent their time fishing from the fitting-out wharfs at the original Matagorda yard. In 1986, they took action. The “redundants” started going to the facility. The unions encouraged them to do so to avoid becoming disassociated from the yard. There, they socialized, took training courses, or simply read the newspaper. Prospects were no better for the 18 ancillary firms with 600 workers. The policy to diversify economic activities in the area had not taken off, and the outlook was bleak. One piece of news that contributed to this impression was that a new decree was under study by the government to “harmonize” the sector with Spain’s new position as a member of the European Community, with the EC institutions preparing a Directive on the shipbuilding sector, their sixth. In December 1986, a new Works Committee was elected, with CCOO gaining a majority of ten seats and CAT and UGT winning eight each. On January 8, 1987, the first skirmishes occurred in what can be called the “battle of Puerto Real.”

On January 8, following a CNT proposal, an assembly decided to barricade the bridge into Cádiz, which was the first of many actions that were to become the workers’ strategic weapons. The police responded with a baton charge, injuring a number of people. When the bridge was blocked for a second time, the government’s tactics changed, and the police simply diverted traffic and waited for the workers to get tired. The situation exploded when, on February 10, a telephone line distribution box was burnt out, cutting off 14,000 telephones. This act was probably committed by an unknown group of workers. A similar act of sabotage was performed a week later. This tactic began to have too great a cost for the authorities, who limited themselves to building up the police ranks, hiring up to 300 more officers, and criminalizing the actions of “a violent minority.” The authorities then ordered the police to enter the yard. This action sparked some dramatic situations in which both police officers and workers were cornered and injured. The Civil Governor himself, the state representative in the province, wasted little time in asking that a “state of emergency” be declared to deal with this “gang of terrorists,” and all the while, the press continued to criminalize the workers. The CNT militants also condemned the Works Committee for disassociating itself and alleging that these were the actions of a “mob.” As one welder and CNT member stated,
It’s the CNT that proposes these actions and when the assembly votes for them the Works Committee goes along with it. They say they’re with the assembly and they’re with the people wherever they are. When things start to get tough they start to say they’ve got nothing to do with it, that it’s just a load of thugs. There are times they say the CNT is the mob. (J. C. H., age 53)

The Assembly also decided to stage protests in the yard every Tuesday. There was a vessel moored at the “de los Viejos” wharf where they would take refuge after road blocks. The police had never dared approach. One day, however, the police attacked the people taking refuge there with smoke canisters and rubber bullets. The news spread like wildfire among the operators working at the yard. They dropped their tools and went to their colleagues’ aid. They surrounded the police, shouting “Get out, get out of my house!” and forced them out. This episode remains deeply engrained in the memories of those involved.

On other occasions, instead of setting up barricades on the bridge into Cádiz, they would demonstrate and march to Puerto Real, bringing traffic to a halt (Figure 2).

In March, the traffic stoppages and barricades extended around a number of places in the town, and especially the neighborhood known as “El Cartabón.” The residents there felt the full force of the police, which led to the more traumatic confrontations that witnesses describe in their accounts. Barricades were set up on all of the roads into the town. Most of the disturbances occurred on the outskirts, with a few skirmishes in the town center itself. Workers and residents coordinated with each other to shut off all access roads with barricades and even blocked the railway line between Cádiz and Seville. The police, meanwhile, came to take the barricades down and assumed positions at points throughout the town.

The events that ensued show that the workers had come to understand that strikes were not a very useful tool. Given the small workload at the shipyard, work stoppages only affected the workers, putting no pressure on the company. In keeping with the earlier scheme for restructuring, the Works Committee set out to “show they were in the right.” That is, they aimed to inform the various administrations and organizations in civil society about the problem. Once this had been done, it would be possible to “tighten the screws.” This statement made by a welder and
Figure 2: Los Astilleros en la Bahía de Cádiz.
Works Committee and CCOO member conveys how the chairman of the Committee at the time explained the restructuring:

The plan was to first show we were in the right. That is, get out into public opinion and talk to local councils, the provincial government, social agents, residents associations, and so on. Thanks to doing all that, we got a demonstration of 100,000 people during the first restructuring. We got our information out in press releases saying we’d met with the Mayor or Mayoress of Cádiz. A month and a half or two we spent giving explanations. Then we started to put the squeeze on. When the government didn’t respond, or not up to our expectations, anyway, then we had to tighten the screws. (J. F., age 57)

Meanwhile, CNT took the opportunity to turn this labor conflict into a social conflict. They could not permit the struggle to be limited to the scope of the company. The struggle had been going on for months with no progress, so road blocks in other parts of the town were proposed. The “El Cartabón” area came to mind as a strategic area that connects Puerto Real with San Fernando.

Neighborhood assemblies were held to explain the situation and invite citizens to take part. A weekly assembly was held in the town center in the Plaza de Jesus, where the Town Hall is located. As one informant recounted, “there was a feeling of a neighborhood assembly,” with “the people out on the street.” For the CNT, these assemblies were a direct democratic body that the Works Committee could not control. An electrician and CNT member explained,

The important thing about these protests the Committee had no control over was the involvement. Anyone could have their say and anyone could propose what they wanted. And then we all went to “El Cartabón,” which is where all the scrapping was going on. (F. A., age 54)

The conflict had moved out of the shipyard and away from the workers themselves to include their families and the town as a whole. It became public in character with the presence of workers’ wives and children at the yard assemblies. From then on, there was a “women’s assembly” and
an assembly on Thursdays, in addition to the Tuesday assembly. When
the struggle spread to the town, the wives of the most committed union
men began to organize and carry out actions in parallel with the workers’
protests. Some people say Pepe Gómez, a leading CNT militant, was in-
strumental in this initiative to mobilize the wives, as a substantial part of
the speeches that he made at the assemblies were aimed directly at them,
leading to wives of workers in all of the unions participating and playing
a prominent role. A large group of women dressed in black assembled
on Tuesdays and blocked the road in “El Cartabón,” “or tried to block the
roads,” as J. C. H. points out, referring to the brutal police reprisals they
endured. They wanted to attract attention and decrease the number of
police who were fighting their husbands outside of the shipyard.

Many local residents joined the workers’ struggle and participated in
the clashes in the streets, especially young people, who had few pros-
pects given the closure of the shipyard. The radicalization of the workers
dragged the largest unions along to the point that, in an attempt to redirect
the situation, they ended up latching onto the most radical proposals.

Blocking the traffic in “El Cartabón” made the police inflict such brutal
reprisals that perhaps the most remembered part of the struggle against
restructuring were the police actions and the skirmishes that occurred. All
of the informants highlighted just how traumatic the experience was. They
were not just blocking the roads, but sabotaging the railway lines, where
the police did not dare to go for fear of being ambushed. Other clashes oc-
curred outside the shipyard on the bridge into Cádiz. After the assemblies
on Tuesdays, barricades were usually thrown up to block the road. The
most committed left the materials that they would use to make the bar-
ricades (e.g., tires and wooden pallets) nearby the night before erecting
them. During these clashes, the workers developed new street fighting tac-
tics. Everyone concerned did their utmost as they were well aware that the
battle would not be won in the ongoing negotiations with the government.
On April 7, the company closed the shipyard. They explained that this step
was necessary to prevent further incidents. Indeed, these incidents still
occurred, on April 9, when the bridge was blocked again and a permanent
assembly called for jailed protestors to be freed. In Seville, seven days later,
incidents occurred that resulted in scores of injuries among hundreds of
people from Puerto Real who had traveled to the regional capital.

Momentum came to a halt in May. Some groups, mainly CCOO and
UGT, were not entirely convinced that their efforts were headed in the right
direction and tried to look for other ways out. CNT and CAT used Labor Day, May 1, to call for people to fight in order to defend young people's right to work. A few days later, a general strike brought a population subjected to genuine police occupation to a standstill. In view of the thousands of people filling the Plaza de Jesus and the surrounding streets, the assembly was closed with a poem that ended with the words: “and if you make them lock us out/There won’t be police enough/to stop our shouts.” In May, the clashes were diminishing; the management and the Works Committee disappeared seemingly into thin air. Tuesdays and Thursdays were still set aside for protests, and after the assemblies, there were incidents and sit-ins until those who were arrested were set free. They reported police abuse and were received in the town with applause.

In the end, the authorities called a meeting in Madrid. As a condition of the meeting, they called for all protests to be abandoned. In exchange, they would talk about taking workers back on and new plans for the shipbuilding industry, among other topics. Both UGT and the authorities said that there were reasons to be optimistic, but CAT, CCOO, and CNT were determined to continue the protests. In addition, there was a new element on the horizon: local elections had been called for June 10. The regional government—the Junta de Andalusia—and the central government, both of which were under the control of the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español), began to leak information about the certainty that the yard would remain open, and CCOO took up fresh calls to spread the protest to other shipyards and continue the sit-ins. The Puerto Real town council even suspended the local fair, and the Mayor went on a hunger strike for several days. The last week of May was the decisive point of the battle as the violent clashes reached their peak, with dozens injured, extensive damage done, and more roads blocked. At this time, the meeting was held where the so-called Jerez Accords were accepted by the protestors.

In the face of escalating violence, the company invited the Works Committee to negotiate. On the afternoon of May 27, they decided to meet at the CCOO headquarters on neutral ground in the neighboring city of Jerez. The company had an ambush planned for the workers. The directors came down from Madrid, and representatives from the four unions at the shipyard—CCOO, UGT, CAT, and CNT—were also present. All of the interviewees remembered how, during the negotiations that day, another act of sabotage in Puerto Real cut off telephone communication in the whole Bay of Cádiz. A group of hooded people had set fire to a telephone
distribution box. Some participants believed that this action gave greater strength to their representatives in the negotiations.

The agreement was reached at 2 a.m. “We had to bring closure to the restructuring. We couldn’t go on living with all that stress every Tuesday and Thursday,” said J. C., who had represented CAT in the negotiations. With the Jerez Accords, the authorities made a commitment that the shipyard would stay open. In exchange, no protests would be held inside the facility. Meanwhile, the further incidents in Puerto Real resulted in two people being arrested at an assembly meeting and then later freed.

The agreement was voted on at a crowded assembly held at the shipyard on June 2. A change in strategy was decided upon, and the crowd agreed not to carry on protesting in the yard at the request of the company. CNT voted against the agreement and proposed that the fight continue. CNT also proposed that local elections in the town be postponed. This proposal was not accepted, but it did lead to almost half of the voters abstaining.

From that moment on, the division between the social agents and the unions became much clearer. CNT tried to keep the protests going, whereas the Works Committee and the other unions wanted them stopped. Then, the Women’s Assembly took the initiative and continued demonstrating on Tuesdays and clashing with the police. The last protests occurred in early July with violent clashes, and barricades were set up after a women’s demonstration. CNT called an assembly at which they condemned the end to the protests. But, the battle was coming to its end: the shipyard was not going to close. As if by magic, contracts for vessels to be built that guaranteed work in the short and medium terms appeared.

The Violence Represented: Activists’ Perceptions of Conflict
As stated earlier, an account of the political struggle backed by strategic violent actions has to consider the struggle between the representations and discourses of actors on both sides. Violence became a catalyst of the various phases of the conflict from its first flickers in January 1987 until the final dénouement, including the transition from a labor conflict to a social conflict. Violence became a rite that was part of the current symbology of events. Numerous references to both economic and physical violence to which workers were subjected can be found both in the interviews and in the documents that the workers prepared. Their lines of argument addressed the wide range of types of power held over them by the various
organizations (police, economic-business, and legal), which had different degrees of intensity but always aimed to single out the most radical workers and suppress them. The workers presented their own violent tactics as a response to a vastly superior opponent. Because the established powers and the workers were such unequal adversaries, the result had to be the radicalization of the protests with the use of physical violence.

In an earlier passage, J. F. explained how the company and the government “tightened the screws”—quite an apt metaphor for how power is exercised in an industrial environment—on the workers to try to force them to accept the restructuring. This was the first mechanism for coercing the workers. The second was confrontation with the police which a Works Committee and CAT member describes:

It was us and them, face-to-face. Some people had their eyes put out. There was fallout to that, there was. A lot of people have had their nerves shot. It was dire. (J. C., age 61, carpenter)

The fierce clashes with the police allowed people to believe in the dream of a man-to-man struggle. It was a fight with different methods, but between men. Looking at the conflict as a whole, these episodes can be understood as rituals of rebellion with perennial consequences in injuries and memories. When the Works Committee went to the police station in a nearby town—there was no police station in Puerto Real itself—to inquire about the injured, they witnessed the results of the clashes with the police. J. F. explained,

We saw the opposing army there and heard the remarks they were making to each other: “the bastards” and “there’s a blond guy over there, I’ve got my eye on him, next time I’ll see to him.” One fellow was limping, another one had got a spike stuck in him, ‘cause we were throwing traffic spikes, and another had sprained something. The superintendent was shouting at us, “You guys, something or other, we’ve got five people injured here, we’ve arrested five...” We ended up talking: we’re gonna let them go or they’re going to court.

There are also specific factors that help to explain the violence inflicted by the police force. For instance, the police perceived a need to nip in the bud any opposition that could be interpreted as government weakness
during the process of far-reaching political and socio-economic change that characterized the so-called democratic transition. CAT member J. C. sees it this way:

The police came down on us hard because that’s what they told them to do. Orders from above. They had to stop us any way they could. We’re talking about the beginnings of democracy, after the transition, and they couldn’t take it.

The interviewees always introduced their own violence into their accounts as a dependent variable once they had clearly explained the hard-line actions taken by the authorities. They justified a certain amount of violence as part of the resistance effort. They also justified violence on the basis of the inequality between the two positions. From their inferior position, the only action that the workers could take against the company and the government was violent social action. The discourses of the activists who subscribed to the autonomist union model demonstrated a greater awareness of the importance of violence in workers’ actions. J. C. explained how acts of sabotage helped in negotiations with the company:

Well, these things, they make you feel stronger. There’s no negotiation without pressure. If we sat down for talks at some point, at ten o’clock in the morning there was an assembly outside the management room. And as soon as the talks had finished there was another assembly straightaway. And messing about going in and out of offices, that all helps the talks, of course it does. You have to know just how far you can go.

In the next passage, an anarcho-syndicalist describes how the workers gradually came to understand that collective action had to become radicalized and operate outside of institutional channels. The struggle could not keep to democratic procedures if it started from a point of inequality between the workers and the government. A CNT member explained,

The union members, from CCOO, to UGT, to CAT, voted on the proposals we made. The people started to see things more clearly and how when things are one-sided, there’s no democracy. I always talked about me fighting Cassius Clay. Absolutely one-sided. But
give me a big sword 500 meters long, and we’re on the same footing. You can’t have any negotiation when one side is so much stronger than the other. You have to be on the same level as them, and for that you have to show them why people go on strike. To show them that the reason you have strikes is to hurt the company in the pocket. How could they think about having 24-hour strikes, two-hour strikes, six-hour strikes, and then in the afternoon, everyone on overtime and shoving up production as hard as they could? (P. G., age 58, carpenter)

The same informant criticizes Delphi workers (part of General Motors) who fought against the relocation of the Puerto Real plant in 2006 for not being radical enough and for waging a controlled struggle through the Works Committee instead of having workers’ assemblies.

The difference between General Motors and us is that they’ve taught them to fight institutionally, top-down. You mustn’t do anything to upset the people driving to Cádiz in their cars. You mustn’t do anything to upset the doctor on his way somewhere or other. You mustn’t upset the painter who’s going somewhere to do his painting. You mustn’t upset...If you don’t upset anyone, you can be absolutely sure that you can go on for 40 years and not get anywhere. If we got to be five years being rotated, it’s ‘cause we had to fight hard for that. And that was important, too. I went every day to push things along, with people to the assembly, to make sure they weren’t playing cards, to see the press, the management, out on the road, out there.

These words are a perfect reflection of workers’ predominant representations of collective action. In fact, P. G., like the workers at the shipyard, has the perception that when you cannot interfere with production because there is no work at the shipyard, any ability to influence political decision-making lies mainly in executing actions that “upset people”: stopping traffic, blocking the bridge, sabotaging telephone lines, and so on. They knew that they would have to confront the police, so they developed tactics and equipment—e.g., catapults, bazookas, barricades, hoods—that have been used in all of the conflicts of any importance since then.

The Works Committee’s version of the story is different. For the Works Committee, the radicalization of the conflict was due to the involvement
of young people with no direct links to the shipyard. Young people who were *anti-system* joined the conflict more and more as the actions spread throughout the town. One CAT member points out that the police began to indiscriminately arrest people who had no connection with the shipyard so that they could attribute the skirmishes to “outside troublemakers”:

Young people took up the fight. They were the children of the workers. There were people who, when things were peaceful, were fine, but as soon as they heard a couple of shots—Bang! Bang!—they high-tailed it. Logical, ‘cause you had to run and there were some people who couldn’t. (M. G., age 61, electrician)

J. F. adds:

My children, they lived near El Cartabón, and I didn’t want them to see what things were like, with all the violence and that. Little kids who’re 14 or 15, they just love a bit of a shindig, and they were right up in the front line. Those kids, what they wanted was a bit of excitement, they smoke a couple of joints and then they want to be in the thick of it. There was a lot of people out of work at that time and a lot of people were rebelling. It wasn’t just a problem with the shipyard anymore. Half an hour after the ructions started, there was just no point in us being there, nothing to do with us.

**Autonomy, Workers’ Movement, and Collective Action**

The main factor that explains the dimension and radicalism of the conflict is the importance of shipbuilding not only for the economy of the region but also as a symbolic reference for the local society. The working class in the Bay of Cádiz developed around the appearance of the shipyards during the last decades of the 19th century, with great functional and geographic mobility and multiple generations of the same families working in the shipbuilding sector. Economic and social relations illustrate the interdependence among the distinct cities and factories of the Bay. At times, we have asked ourselves whether the fact that the restructuring occurred at different times in Cádiz and Puerto Real contributed to its triumph.

Second, the radicalism of collective action cannot be understood without understanding autonomous workers’ structures that differ from
official trade-unionism, although these organizations lost control over the struggle. These structures included mainly CCOO and UGT. The workers' movement in Puerto Real during the 1970s and 1980s was the result of a combination of elements from state trade unionism and elements from the autonomous model. These union structures were evident in the shipyard from early on. When we write about the presence of the “autonomous” model, we do not refer to the creation of “platforms” or “coordinating committees,” which, at the margins of trade unions, participate in or lead the movement. Instead, we refer to a trade unionism that is not engaged with social pact policies recorded in the “Moncloa Agreements.” This is true of both CNT and CAT, although these two organizations have noteworthy differences. The main difference between them is the anarcho-syndicalist character of CNT. Although both have points of contact in “self-managed socialism,” which also defined the USO union in that period, CNT incorporated aspects of anarchism. The second difference is the acceptance and participation of CAT in Works Committees and shop-floor elections. CNT, on the contrary, defended its trade union model based on sovereign assemblies and union sections.

That diversity nearly brought about confrontation, as J. C. H. stated:

They always have been on one side, and we have been on the other. Our worst relations were with the people of Comisiones [CCOO]. At the personal level, we had good relations with the militants of CAT and UGT. But, during the assemblies, we always were on one side with our proposals, and they were on another side, the side of the Committee.

The restructuring in Puerto Real unmistakably reflected the confrontation between the two models. Nevertheless, the strategies of both were more complex. CCOO did not always hold the same position as UGT, which—aligned to the governing party, the PSOE—assumed the main cost of the restructuring process. As a consequence, it has a weak presence in the sector today.

The assemblyist tradition of these workers went beyond the state labor laws, which conceded a wide set of rights to Works Committees and restricted participation in assemblies and union sections. During the conflict, the threatened workers organized assemblies regularly. Assemblies were the sovereign organ of decision-making, overruling the Works Committee.
The Committee could lose all of its legitimacy if its members acted against the assembly. Its members acknowledged this threat in this way:

In that moment the Committee assumed that what the assembly said was sovereign. People were educated that regardless of their disagreement with what was decided in the assembly, they had to go ahead. They could not step back. (J. C.)

The CNT union organizers said that their main concern was guaranteeing that the assemblies remained at the center of the decision-making process. In accord with their horizontal trade union model, they strictly surveyed all of the movements of the Committee and made their proposals in the assembly. In the culminating moments of the conflict, most of their proposals were approved:

The assemblies approved most of the proposals of CNT. When we entered into a negotiation process, they started to win, especially when they brought an agreement that was a solution to the problem. (J. C. H)

For the CNT, the key issue was the voting process, and its militants always defended the system of raised hands:

We have always said that we are old enough. Nobody had to hide anything. We had to be men. Each one was free to state their opinion and vote however he wanted, and nobody could reprimand him. So always raising hands. The secret ballot was applied once and only five percent of the workers voted. (F. A., age 54, electrician, CNT)

P. A., a member of the Works Committee, recognized that the assemblies were the main organ for decision-making. In them, the proposals of the CNT counted for a lot, although the CNT had no representatives on the state board governing the restructuring. Sometimes its members even found out about new decisions during the assemblies, where the Works Committee informed the workers about the situation. Because no progress was made in the negotiations, the workers decided to mobilize. The assemblies occurred inside the factory, in an area today called the “historic part.” One of the features of the factory is that it has a platform
from which speakers could be seen by all attending. Assemblies of over 5,000 workers occurred there.

The assemblies were “self-called.” In each assembly, the attendees decided the date of the next assembly. Because not all workers attended, the organizers appointed a “culebrina” to mobilize the rest of the employees when they decided to undertake an action.8 The “culebrina” consisted of a group of workers who walked through the plant with a megaphone, stopping production and getting people to join in. When the “culebrina” passed workshops and offices, people used to stop working, at least at that moment, and then resume working when it had passed by. The participants in the protests stated that those who skipped the “culebrina” were mainly managers and intermediate officials. The most active participants shared the perception that only a few workers participated in the most engaging actions. F. A., from CNT, critiqued the Workers’ Committee for always being in the rear: “They never came to the barricades. They always tried to cut out. Never faced up to the police, except some who occasion-ally went to the barricades.”

A possible explanation for the presence of autonomous trade unionism, a strange bird in the second half of the 1980s, could be found in the elements of the assemblyist tradition that contributed to the shipbuilders’ work culture. P. G. stated:

When I joined the shipyard I found a vital world. It was a working-class culture, of poverty, of respect, very authoritarian. Later, when I got older, I realized that the people have to be disciplined, if not, your personality ends up diverted.

As Ferruelo Magán (1999:112) points out, the inescapable cyclical standstills that are part of the history of both the factory and the sector favored dynamics more related to unionism than to mass production. As a result, there was an ingrained sense of collective solidarity and a sense of interdependence among the workers, the factory, and their families. Labor relations entangled with kinship relations: several generations lived together in the domestic sphere and worked together in the factory. Moreover, the manufacturing organizational model involved working-class neighborhoods in which coworkers were also neighbors. On the other hand, there were issues of risk, workplace accidents, the type of relationship with the
final product—not as depersonalized as in other industrial processes—and the role of Christian social reformism within the company. All of these elements formed the breeding ground for the emergence of autonomous action. The strong connections between the city and shipbuilding, practically since its beginnings, must not be forgotten. They acted as a silent but effective cultural support that fostered the identification of the workers and their families with their jobs, their spaces, and their locality.

Concluding Remarks: Political and Cultural Factors in the Puerto RealProtests

The Puerto Real protests are unique in the extent and radicalism of their mobilizations. Sociology and anthropology have addressed the relationship between the loss of centrality of work as a mechanism of social production and of the workers’ life trajectories and expectations and the post-Fordist organizational model (Sennett 2000). The historical crossroads at which the workers found themselves were well defined by Dahrendorf by the end of the 1980s: “currently work is not the obvious answer to social problems, but part of the problem itself” (1990:172).

In Puerto Real, this transition was the root of important social conflicts such as the described episode. We assert that the economic and symbolic interdependence between the shipyard and Puerto Real made possible the social extension of the conflict and the conversion of the city into a “battlefield.” That is why activists first proposed to spread their arguments through local society. Once local support was established, the activists could initiate radical tactics to gain advantages for the negotiations and, hence, to reduce the institutional, political, and symbolic pre-eminence of the state, which aimed to progressively dismantle the sector. In other words, the workers’ protests were connected to a new structural frame that included a set of governmental dispositions in line with the new tendencies of capital accumulation and structural change in the economic system. These changes yielded a new social contract that some civil society organizations did not accept. As long as the new social and labor frame is not accepted by the implied social network, one could say that market violence is occurring, to which Giddens (1996) made reference. In a relatively short period of time, the new agreement threw hundreds of workers on the scrapheap. The union members told us of major outrage, and their stories gave the impression that they understood that this
struggle was the last chance to maintain their way of life. They seemed to perceive clearly that their work culture was being condemned by economic planning in favor of rationalizing profit on a large scale.

The workers’ response involved a set of mechanisms of violence that expressed their disagreement with the adopted policies but that also aimed to change the status quo. Their testimonies reflect their conviction that it was an entirely political strategy to engage in negotiations with the state-company. A distinctive feature of this episode is that it marked a break with the system of social agreement in the context of the incipient democracy. The nascent formal democracy had been instrumentalized as a great social consensus, an expression of political and ethical rationalization. Nevertheless, it was suspended for several months because of the determined action of an organized group of workers—a symbol of the new social order—joined by relatives and rebellious youth. The Puerto Real episodes were a challenge to a nascent system that had to closely monitor the many social movements bursting onto the political stage with differing goals and tactics.

For Tilly (1978), the social struggle expressed by means of strikes and demonstrations related to labor demands falls within the proactive type as long as the protestors pursue immediate socio-economic and labor improvements without questioning the market or the state. Nonetheless, the shipyard protests that we study here have certain characteristics that resemble a reactive movement of survival like those that arise in profound crises. As we pointed out at the beginning, to explain the described episode, we could adapt Tarrow’s (1998) model of contentious collective action. Nevertheless, we should introduce serious modifications to avoid envisioning collective action as a mere rational strategy used by actors who, under the same conditions as their opponents, deploy their most efficient tactics to achieve their goals. The movement first incorporated the values, objectives, and behaviors of a comprehensive historical work culture; then, the movement was enriched by the objectives and proceedings of an alternative trade union movement. Thus, Puerto Real took the form of a sustained action by means of strategies of rebellion, but it took advantage of the institutional frame of its work cultures (its spaces, forms of solidarity, and values) and was consciously dramatic. As a social movement, the workers fought to cultivate a social network, to use their cultural resources, to elaborate a political ideology—which challenged the political economic system—and to carry out a trade union
model that was not hegemonic in the global context despite making a vigorous showing locally. In other words, a project was underway, at least implicitly, to create a collective identity based on the workers’ traditional work culture and on the model of collective union action. In this particular case, the self-managed trade union model must play an important role. The spokespeople of official trade unions and the agents from the economic and political bureaucracy always envisioned the movement as a protest demanding labor improvements and acted towards it with the goal of speeding up its neutralization (by segregating the most active and violent agents, discrediting its statements through media discourse, locating the agents under the rubric of social and economic irrationality, fostering job insecurity and flexibility of labor conditions, and financing the loss of jobs in the short term by developing policies of economic compensation for the workers expelled from the system). The fact that this kind of protest developed so recently, in the last years of the 20th century, can be explained by the particular socio-economic modernization of Spain. Industrialization did not intensify until the late Franco period, when the position of the State was relatively weak—in particular, in relation to social instruments. That is, in a context such as the transition described here, it was necessary to guarantee equilibrium and avoid radicalism to maintain the status quo. The activists realized that they could also tighten the screws in the political and institutional environment of a nascent democracy. The state’s punitive tools could not reproduce Francoist practices easily, and society in general was willing to allow the workers to fight for what they regarded as legitimate rights—to work, to demonstrate, and to oppose the state—when it was not suitable for attaining their new aims: the transformation of the political economy frame and the discontinuation of the recently initiated industrial modernization projects.

We can conclude that there was a strong relationship between the presence of autonomous workers’ structures (assemblies, workshop committees, and union sections in which direct democracy was practiced) and the radicalism of collective action. Workers and popular assemblies often surpassed the control of workers’ unitary representation structures, leading to actions of a more drastic nature, such as prolonged road blocks, barricades, street fighting, and sabotage.

This autonomist and assemblyist tradition was related to the work culture that prevailed in the shipyard. Oral sources have given us narratives describing a work culture deeply influenced by the local corporate culture.
and characterized by social welfare that is vanishing. From this point of view, the importance of the shipyard as a workplace has not declined both in economic and symbolic terms. In the end, the struggle against restructuring was only the response of a group of workers to the end of one era and the beginning of another.

Acknowledgments:

This article is a partial result of the research project PRY-014/08 “Reconversión naval, sindicalismo y protesta popular en el astillero de Puerto Real,” funded by the Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces in 2008. We would like to express my gratitude to Martin Howard for his help with the translation of part of this article.

Endnotes:

1This movement’s anti-capitalist organization practices spread throughout the state in the 1970s. The most significant milestones in the process were the 1970 strike in Granada; strikes at the La Maquinista, Harry Walter, and Roca companies in Barcelona in the 1970s; the Barcelona dockers’ struggle (1976-1988); and the Azpeitia autonomous movement during the same period, which escalated to the point that an armed struggle was necessary to end it (Espai en Blanc 2008).

2In the Spanish system of labor relations, the Works Committee is the representative body of the staff in the firms or workplaces. The number of members of each trade union in this organ depends on the number of votes received in the periodic union elections.

3A local trade union that was formed after a split in the Christian USO (Workers Labor Union).

4According to García Blanco (2007), this is a way to overcome the lack of dominant approaches in reflection on violence, whether they have a minimalist focus (which does not take into account its social and systemic character, but focuses on the types of violence exercised by individuals, who are considered to be asocial) or are dramatizing approaches, maximalist in a Galtungesque (1975, 1990) way, that start from the idea that it is impossible to distinguish violence as a systemic structural attribute of the social fabric from violence as an attribute of its support by the social system.

5It is important to highlight that the autonomous protests by workers’ wives were repeated in 2006 with the closure of the Delphi plant, located near the shipyard in Puerto Real. I shall reflect on the meaning of these collective actions below.

6We use Gluckman’s (1954) concept of “ritual of rebellion” in the sense of social-political actions with cathartic effects. Nevertheless, we do not share Gluckman’s functionalist view of rebellion as a cyclical process that leads to a stabilization of society and a diminishing of political tensions.

7This agreement was signed in October 1977 between the constituent government and the main political parties. In a context of severe economic crisis, employers’ organizations, the CCOO, and, later, UGT supported the pact. Only CNT remained opposed to this agreement, which laid the foundations for the 1978 Constitution. One of the consequences of this pact was the neutralization of the intense workers’ action that characterized that period.

8Although the workers do not know the origin of the term, it seems to come from the name of a snake (“culebra” in Spanish), or from herpes zoster, because of the way the group of workers moved within the shipyard.

9According to Tilly’s (1978) typology, reactive protests occurred in the 18th and 19th centuries, until the decisive consolidation of the industrialization process, and were characterized by the demand that workers continue to have rights that were perceived as threatened by the advancement of the state or the market. Tilly himself recognizes that those protests reappear in situations of crisis and political and economic collapses, such as the case described. Moreover, Tilly understands his typology as describing ideal types that are mixed in social practice, so there is no way of labeling his proposal as reifying. Therefore, workers’ struggles can be reactive, proactive, competitive, or any combination of the three at the same time, depending on the objectives and goals of the social agents and on the frames in which they operate.
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**Foreign Language Translations**

Tightening the Screws: Autonomy, Collective Action, and Violence in Puerto Real During the Second Shipbuilding Restructuring

[Keywords: Trade unionism, workers’ autonomy, violence, collective action, shipbuilding restructuring, shipyard, Spain]

Apretar las tuercas. Autonomía, acción colectiva y violencia en el astillero de Puerto Real durante la segunda Reconversión Naval

[Palabras claves: sindicalismo, autonomía obrera, violencia, acción colectiva, reconversión naval, astillero, España]

栓紧螺丝: 自治, 集体行动, 与暴力在波多黎各第二次造船业重整期

关键词：商业工会主义, 工人自治, 暴力, 集体行动, 造船业重整, 船务, 西班牙

Закручивание гаек: автономность, коллективное действие и насилие в Пуэрто-Рико во время второй перестройки судостроительной промышленности

[Ключевые слова: профсоюзное движение, автономность рабочих, насилие, коллективное действие, перестройка судостроительного завода, Испания]

Apertando os Parafusos: Autonomia, Acção Colectiva e Violência em Puerto Real Durante a Segunda Reestruturação dos Estaleiros Navais

[Palavras chave: sindicalismo, autonomia dos trabalhadores, violência, acção colectiva, reestruturação da construção naval, estaleiros, Espanha]

تشديد الخناق: الحكم الذاتي، والعمل الجماعي، والعنف في بورتو رئال خلال إعادة هيكلة بناء السفن الثانية

كلمات البحث: الحركات النقابية، استقلالية العمال، العنف، العمل الجماعي، إعادة هيكلة بناء السفن، محل بناء السفن، إسبانيا

921