1. Introduction

This paper seeks to show that the relevance of the so-called attitudinal utterances lies in something that may be too obvious – the expression of attitudes – but which is fundamental for the achievement of communicative effects such as rapport, solidarity, affinity, etc., on which social relations crucially depend. It argues that the achievement of such effects depends on the attribution of not only beliefs and implications that can be derived from those beliefs, but also of attitudes, feelings and emotions. Additionally, this paper also contends that the repetition of attitudinal utterances that may have been previously produced by an individual other than the speaker or utterances whose content resembles that of other previous attitudinal utterances may be interpreted as phatic. As a result, the relevance of those utterances resides in a combination of attitudes that is also essential for the achievement of the effects mentioned.

The structure of this paper is as follows. Firstly, it explains and exemplifies what attitudinal utterances are. Secondly, it addresses the problem of the relevance of these utterances and hypothesises about the mental operations that may take place in the hearer’s mind for the communicative effects mentioned to arise. Finally, this paper considers what may happen when past attitudinal utterances produced by the hearer or an individual other than the speaker or attitudinal utterances similar to past ones produced by them are repeated and why the effects mentioned may originate.

2. Attitudinal utterances

Consider the following utterances:

(1) That shirt looks great on you!
(2) I really like the way you dress!
(3) That is a good idea.
(4) You did a great job!/Great job!
(5) What a beautiful house!
In contexts in which the addressee is wearing a beautiful, new shirt (1), always appears in fashionable, expensive cloth (2), has made a good and quite reasonable suggestion (3), has done something in the appropriate or expected way (4) or has just shown his house to the speaker (5), these utterances would be regarded as compliments. For utterances like these to be interpreted as compliments, the speaker must show admiration or approval towards some personal trait, action, object or achievement which can be attributed or is related to the hearer, and which both the speaker and the hearer value or judge positively (Wolfson and Manes 1980; Manes and Wolfson 1981; Wolfson 1983; Holmes and Brown 1987; Holmes 1988; Herbert 1989, 1990, 1991; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1989; Jaworski 1995). In Searle’s (1969) taxonomy of speech acts, compliments fall within the group of *expressives* because their propositional content specifies the speaker’s reaction towards a state of affairs in which she has an active or passive role. What is therefore important to note is that with compliments the speaker – or complimenter – expresses an attitude, and the attitude she expresses is one of admiration or approval towards the complimented personal trait, action, object or achievement or the complimented person – i.e. the *complimentee*. The expression and recognition of this attitude is fundamental for the interpretation of utterances as compliments. If the speaker did not express this attitude and/or the hearer did not recognise it, the hearer could interpret these utterances not as compliments, but differently: as criticism, complaints, ironies or, if the assumptions that they make manifest were already manifest to the hearer (cfr. Žegarac 1998) and he thought that the speaker’s intention was to ‘break the ice’ or avoid silence by saying something nice, as mere phatic remarks.

Consider now the following utterances:

(6) You are late!
(7) Why don’t you shut up?
(8) It is getting hard to live in this city.
(9) The noise in this street is simply unbearable.
(10) Opera performances at *Maestranza* are so expensive!

In situations in which the hearer is late to a date (6), is speaking and disturbing his classmates (7), the living conditions in a city are getting worse (8), there is too much noise in a street at night (9) or certain performances at a theatre are unaffordable (10), these utterances would be examples of complaints. As opposed to compliments, with complaints the speaker – or complainer – does not express a
feeling of approval or admiration, but a wide array of negative feelings, emotions or attitudes that comprise frustration, discomfort, dissatisfaction, discontent, displeasure, disapproval, censure, grievance, culpability, negligence, anxiety, indignation, etc. These feelings, emotions or attitudes are projected towards the hearer’s or someone else’s present or past behaviour, or towards some event or state of affairs. Complaints can be targeted to the hearer (6, 7), in which case they are direct, or to some event, state of affairs or individual other than the hearer (8-10), in which case they are indirect. Traditionally, complaints have also been considered cases of expressives (Searle 1969) because of the expression of a feeling, emotion or attitude or different converging ones. As in the case of compliments, the expression and recognition of a particular attitude is also essential for the interpretation of some utterances as complaints (Edmondson and House 1981; Boxer 1993; Olshtain and Weinbach 1993; Trosborg 1995; Günthner 1997; Dersley and Wootton 2000; Edwards 2000; Laforest 2002; Acuña Ferreira 2002-2003, 2004; Edwards 2005; Lee 2006; Yoon 2007).

Compliments and complaints were included in the group of what Edmondson and House (1981) labelled attitudinal illocutions. With these illocutions or speech acts, the speaker expresses a positive or negative attitude towards a particular event or state of affairs. Attitudinal illocutions can be about a future event (re future event) or a current or past event (re non-future event). Among the former, Edmondson and House (1981: 49) listed requests, suggestions, invitations, permissions, wishes and resolutions, while among the latter they included apologies, excuses, thanks, mitigations, congratulations or condolences. Although in some cases it is relatively easy to see that the speaker expresses an attitude with these speech acts, in others it is not that easy to identify what her attitude may be.

However, there are more utterances wherewith the speaker expresses attitudes, which did not appear in Edmondson and House’s (1981) classification. For example, Carston (1996) has shown that denials express an attitude of rejection or dissociation from an utterance or thought that the speaker attributes to the hearer or someone else. Thus, in the following example the second speaker rejects or dissociates from the first speaker’s belief that she is in a particular mood:

(11)  
Peter: Oh, you’re in a miserable foul mood tonight!
Mary: I’m not in a miserable foul mood; I’m a little tired and would like to be left alone. (Carston 1996: 322)
Similarly, Blakemore (1994) and Noh (1995, 1998, 2000) have argued that with echo-questions the speaker expresses a questioning attitude towards another utterance or thoughts that she attributes to another individual:

(12)  
Peter: You finally managed to solve the problems.  
Mary: Managed? I solved them in two minutes. (Noh 2000: 218)

Finally, another type of utterance wherewith the speaker expresses an attitude is ironic utterances. Consider now the examples below (13-17) produced in contexts in which it is manifest to the interlocutors that the living conditions in a particular city are horrible because of traffic, house prices, unemployment, etc. (13); that the speaker does not like the hearer to shout at her or when he speaks to her very loudly (14); that the speaker would not like to get home after a hard day of work and find on the table an extremely disgusting and disappointing dinner waiting for her (15); that the mayor of a city is not doing anything to keep the city clean (16), or that an opera singer’s performance was not satisfactory (17):

(13)  Seville, the city to live in!  
(14)  I really love you when you shout at me!  
(15)  When you get home after a hard day of work, there is nothing like a good dish of cold soup and a good dish of incredibly greasy spinach!  
(16)  Alfred is so efficient as mayor! He always keeps the city clean for tourists!  
(17)  Sofia’s performance was splendid.

The utterances would be clearly ironic. In relevance-theoretic pragmatics (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995; Wilson 1999, 2000, 2001-2002; Wilson and Sperber 2002, 2004), ironic utterances are described as interpretive utterances with which the speaker metarepresents other possible utterances or thoughts with a similar content. Ironic utterances do not make truthful assertions, but faithful interpretations of the speaker’s or someone else’s utterances or thoughts, so they are *attributive metarepresentations* (Wilson 1999: 143). However, what is remarkable is that the speaker expresses her own attitude towards the utterances or thoughts she metarepresents, so ironic utterances are *echoic interpretive metarepresentations*. As such, they achieve an optimal level of relevance because of the speaker’s expression of her attitude, which can be one of dissociation, rejection or disapproval of the proposition expressed. The relevance of ironic utterances lies precisely in the expression of such an attitude. In relevance-theoretic pragmatics, denials and echo-
questions are also analysed as cases of echoic metarepresentations because of the expression of an attitude of rejection or questioning, respectively, and as attributive metarepresentations because of the attribution of thoughts or utterances to some other individual.

3. On the relevance of attitudinal utterances

The expression of a particular attitude is fundamental for the interpretation of attitudinal utterances. These utterances achieve an optimal degree of relevance when the hearer perceives and recognises the attitude the speaker expresses. Such recognition involves the recovery of explicatures, a process in which the hearer may rely on linguistic elements such as mood indicators, interjections or prosody; paralinguistic elements such as the speaker’s facial expressions or gestures, and his own encyclopaedic information regarding the speaker’s likes, opinions, possible reactions when facing particular situations, etc. Besides, the recovery of the explicature of an utterance also involves a certain degree of mind-reading abilities and attribution of mental states. Depending on whether the hearer is aware of certain linguistic, paralinguistic and extralinguistic information and reads the speaker’s mind in one direction or another – and, consequently, attributes a particular mental state to the speaker – he will conclude that the speaker has a particular attitude towards the propositional content of the utterance or the content she has metarepresented. And, depending on the attitude the hearer feels or has evidence to think the speaker has, he will interpret an attitudinal utterance in one way or another.

However, attitudinal utterances such as compliments, indirect complaints, ironies and denials may also achieve an optimal level of relevance as a consequence of the communicative effects they produce. In the literature, compliments and indirect complaints are often said to favour social relationships because of their contribution to the generation of rapport, solidarity or affect between interlocutors. Rather than being face-threatening acts (Brown and Levinson 1987), they would be face-enhancing, face-boosting or face-satisfying acts1 (Laver 1974, 1981; Wolfson and Manes 1980; Manes and Wolfson 1981; Wolfson 1983; Herbert 1989, 1990; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 1989; Jaworski 1995; Günthner 1997; Drew 1998; Boyle

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1 The term face-enhancing act is used by Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1992, 1997) and Sifianou (1995, 1997), while other authors prefer terms such as face-boosting (Bayraktaroglu, 1991) or face-satisfying (Hickey and Vázquez Orta, 1994).
2000; Acuña-Ferreira 2002-2003; Edwards 2005). Regarding compliments, Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk comments that these utterances “[…] make the addressee feel good by saying something nice to him/her, in this way satisfying the addressee’s expectations rather than expressing a position judgement for a referential or informative reason […]” (1989: 75). Concerning indirect complaints, despite the negative interactive outcomes that can be linked to some direct complaints, Günthner (1997), Drew (1998), Acuña Ferreira (2002-2003, 2004) and Edwards (2005) have found that indirect complaints about a third party function as an efficient interactive mechanism of association between interlocutors and result in emotional reciprocity, rapport, strengthening of their links of solidarity, re-affirmation of complicity or the construction of a common identity. Ironic utterances, denials and echo-questions may also achieve an optimal level of relevance in the same way and contribute to rapport, solidarity and affect with the hearer or some other individual who may have a similar attitude to the one the speaker expresses with these utterances. The problem now is to account for how such effects may arise, which amounts to address the mental operations that may take place in the hearer’s mind when processing this type of utterances.

It is necessary to take into account two important facts. On the one hand, the recognition of an attitude is fundamental for the correct interpretation of attitudinal utterances, and such recognition requires metarepresentation. Just in the same way individuals can make attributions of beliefs, they can make attributions of attitudes. On the other hand, although attitudinal utterances express the speaker’s own attitude towards something, that very expression of an attitude or the propositional content of the utterance may also provoke a particular reaction to the hearer, who may therefore have another attitude which may coincide with that of the speaker’s.

In many communicative situations, the effects associated with attitudinal utterances may arise fortuitously. When the speaker produces an attitudinal utterance and expresses her attitude towards something – whatever that attitude may be – and the hearer processes that utterance, he has to recover the explication of that utterance. As has been said, such process involves the exploitation of linguistic, paralinguistic and extralinguistic information and metarepresentation. Taking that information into account, the hearer may attribute a particular attitude to the speaker and, as a result, end up with a particular propositional-attitude description. Such an attitude attribution or the propositional content of the utterance may in turn cause him to
experience some feelings or emotions or have a particular attitude, too. If the hearer feels that the feelings, emotions or attitude towards the facts, events, objects or states of affairs alluded to in the utterance, which he then experiences, correspond to the one he has attributed to the speaker, the production of attitudinal utterances may result in rapport, solidarity, affect, reciprocity, affinity or ties of union. This may be so because the hearer perceives that he and the speaker share the same attitude towards those facts, events, objects or states of affairs.

The relevance of attitudinal utterances may certainly reside in their contribution to rapport, solidarity and affect. In previous work, I have also argued that these effects may arise as a result of an intersection of both interlocutors’ cognitive environments (Padilla Cruz 2004, 2005, 2007, in press). When uttering a compliment, an indirect complaint, an ironic utterance, a denial or an echo-question, some of the assumptions that the speaker metarepresents and makes manifest to the hearer may be similar to those the hearer can retrieve from memory or construct on the fly during interpretation. This is virtually possible because both individuals share a physical setting and cognitive abilities (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 41). The fact that they interact in the same physical setting and think that they have similar abilities provides them with evidence about what is more or less likely for them to entertain (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 45). From the assumptions that become manifest to the hearer, he can derive further weak assumptions about what the speaker is thinking. In other words, the hearer can have intuitions about what the speaker thinks and attribute to the speaker the manifestness of assumptions that are similar to those that are manifest to him at that moment. For those assumptions to be in fact similar, the hearer must also sense that the speaker can derive contextual or logical implications that are, in turn, similar to those he can derive from those assumptions.

The situation described so far is one in which interlocutors typically may not know each other or the speaker may not know what the hearer is likely to think about particular facts, events, behaviours or states of affairs or his attitude towards them. In this situation, there may arise a fortuitous intersection of both interlocutors’ cognitive environments, as a result of which the hearer may feel that his thoughts are to some extent similar to those of the speaker’s, or it may become manifest to the hearer that the attitude that the speaker expresses coincides with the one he has towards the facts, events, behaviours or states of affairs mentioned in attitudinal utterances. In this situation, the speaker has not sought to produce the effects associated with phatic
utterances on purpose; rather, they arise as a direct consequence of the hearer’s attribution of an attitude to the speaker; the manifestness of some assumptions constituting the speaker’s informative intention which lead the hearer to have an attitude similar to the one that he attributes to the speaker, or the hearer’s intuition that the speaker can or may derive some implications from the assumptions manifest to her – which she also makes manifest to the hearer – which are similar to the ones the hearer has derived. In other situations, however, interlocutors know each other and may have some intuitions or evidence about their respective opinions about or attitudes towards some facts, events, behaviours or states of affairs.

4. On the relevance of repeated or recurrent attitudinal utterances

In many cases, individuals may possess some knowledge about the assumptions that their interlocutors may entertain about some aspects of reality on some occasions, maybe because they have interacted before, have mentioned something about those aspects of reality or belong to the same cultural group. In such situations, the speaker may intentionally seek or provoke an intersection of her cognitive environment with that of the hearer by uttering compliments, indirect complaints, denials, echo-questions or ironic utterances about facts, events, states of affairs with which she thinks the hearer is also acquainted.

The speaker may be aware of what the hearer’s attitude towards some facts, states of affairs or object is likely to be as a consequence of having previously or repeatedly interacted with him and, therefore, read his mind. Although the hearer’s attitude or feelings towards that fact, state of affairs, object, etc. might obviously have changed over time, the speaker may have some intuitions about what they might be. As a result, he may attribute to the hearer some attitude, emotion or feeling towards some fact, state of affairs or object and produce an utterance wherewith he expresses an attitude that is the same as or similar to the one she thinks or believes the hearer has towards that object, state of affairs, etc. When the hearer exploits the linguistic, paralinguistic and extralinguistic information and reads the speaker’s mind in order to recover the explicature of the utterance and checks that the propositional-attitude description he recovers coincides to a greater or lesser extent with his own attitude toward that fact, event, object, etc., he will probably experience some degree of affinity, rapport, solidarity, like-mindedness, etc.
However, the speaker may also repeat previous compliments, indirect complaints, denials, echo-questions or ironic utterances or resort to utterances whose content is similar to other utterances the hearer may have already produced in the past or resembles assumptions already manifest to the hearer. Consequently, such utterances would be phatic, for their level of informativeness would be low and they could be interpreted as being more oriented towards the relational aspect of interaction (Žegarac 1998; Žegarac and Clark 1999).

The relevance of repeated or recurrent phatic utterances or utterances that may resemble the assumptions the hearer already entertains clearly does not reside in the assumptions that these utterances make manifest, for those assumptions are already manifest to both interlocutors. Their relevance lies somewhere else: in the social effects that they may generate (Wilson 2001-2002). Their relevance may certainly lie in their contribution to rapport, solidarity and affect because the speaker metarepresents assumptions that she senses or has evidence to think are manifest to the hearer or are similar to the assumptions manifest to the hearer. These effects also depend on the interlocutors’ metarepresentational abilities, as the speaker attributes the manifestness of certain assumptions to the hearer. Therefore, when the speaker repeats some attitudinal utterances or resorts to recurrent attitudinal utterances in previous conversations, the production of those utterances involves a certain amount of attributive metarepresentation (Padilla Cruz 2004, 2005, 2007). Since those repeated or recurrent attitudinal utterances are assigned phatic interpretations, they also transmit the speaker’s attitude of endorsement, acceptance or approval of some assumptions that are already manifest to the interlocutors (Padilla Cruz 2004, 2005, 2007).

The speaker may know or be aware of the hearer’s point of view about some facts, events, behaviours or states of affairs because the hearer or some other individual has previously uttered a compliment, an indirect compliment, an ironic comment, a denial or an echo-question referring to a specific fact, event, object or state of affairs. By repeating or resorting to compliments or indirect complaints previously produced by the hearer or another individual, the speaker attributes some assumptions to him and provides him with evidence that he also entertains assumptions that are similar to those already manifest to the hearer. Consequently, the hearer may notice the speaker’s attribution and sense that both of them may derive similar logical or contextual implications from the assumptions manifest to
them. However, what is important to note is that the speaker expresses an attitude of endorsement, acceptance or approval towards the content of a previous utterance that also conveys an attitude towards that content.

When ironic utterances, denials, or echo-questions are initially produced by the hearer or some other individual, they are *per se* echoic metarepresentations wherewith the hearer attributes the thoughts or utterances mentioned to someone else and simultaneously questions, rejects or dissociates from those thoughts or utterances. When later on the speaker repeats those utterances or resorts to other utterances resembling those the hearer has previously produced, what the speaker does is to make an echoic attributive metarepresentation of another previous echoic attributive metarepresentation. Therefore, owing to the attributive and echoic nature of phatic utterances, what happens when ironic utterances, denials and echo-questions are repeated later on in subsequent conversations and become phatic is that the utterances or thoughts that ironic utterances, denials or echo-questions previously made manifest to the interlocutors are metarepresented again. Thus, what can be labelled as phatic ironies, phatic denials and phatic echo-questions attributively metarepresent utterances or thoughts that previous ironic utterances, denials and echo-questions have already made manifest to the interlocutors. Since ironic utterances, denials and echo-questions previously produced by the hearer initially metarepresented utterances or thoughts that could be attributed to the hearer himself, phatic ironies, phatic denials and phatic echo-questions would be echoic attributive metarepresentations of those previous interpretive attributive metarepresentations.

As with compliments and indirect complaints, the assumptions that the speaker metarepresents in phatic ironies, phatic denials and phatic echo-questions may be similar to those the hearer metarepresented when he firstly produced one of those utterances, and to the assumptions he may entertain when the speaker repeats the hearer’s words or similar words. As in the situation in which interlocutors do not know each other, such similarity involves the possibility of deriving some logical or contextual implications. The hearer must sense that the speaker can derive logical or contextual implications similar to those he can derive or has already derived at some previous moment. Moreover, since those utterances are interpreted as phatic because they are repeated and, therefore, have a low level of informativeness, what may be highly manifest to the interlocutors is that both of them have a particular attitude towards the facts, events, behaviours or states of affairs to which the utterances refer.
Ironic utterances, denials and echo-questions all transmit a characteristic attitude towards their propositional content, and so do phatic utterances. When Ironic utterances, denials and echo-questions are repeated in subsequent conversations and become phatic, part of their relevance would reside in the joint expression of those two attitudes, which merge and combine.

As Wilson (1999, 2000) puts it, in many cases the relevance of some types of utterances resides not only in the expression of one attitude but in a combination of attitudes. When compliments, indirect complaints, echo-questions, denials or ironic utterances are repeated and become phatic, their relevance lies in the attitude of endorsement, acceptance or approval that the speaker expresses towards a previous attitude expressed by the hearer or some other individual. Therefore, the relevance of those utterances would reside in the attitude of endorsement, acceptance or approval that the speaker expresses and projects towards a previous attitude of dissociation, rejection, approval, admiration, indignation, frustration, discomfort, etc. already expressed by the hearer or some other individual towards a previously metarepresented content, i.e. towards previous facts, events, behaviours, states of affairs, etc. Such combinations could be labelled as follows:

- In the case of phatic compliments, agreement/endorsement/acceptance of admiration, admiring endorsement or approving endorsement.
- In the case of phatic indirect complaints, rejecting agreement, agreement in frustration/discomfort/dissatisfaction/discontent/anxiety/indignation/disapproval/rejection (Padilla Cruz, in press).
- In the case of phatic denials and ironies, agreement in dissociation, approval of dissociation, dissociative agreement or rejecting agreement (Padilla Cruz 2008).
- In the case of phatic echo-questions, agreement in questioning, approval of questioning, questioning agreement or questioning approval.

These combinations of attitudes would be essential for the generation of rapport, solidarity and affect. With phatic compliments, phatic indirect complaints, phatic denials and ironies and phatic echo-questions the speaker does not only express a certain attitude characteristic of them – an attitude of admiration or approval characteristic of compliments, an attitude of frustration, indignation, discomfort, etc. characteristic of indirect complaints, an attitude of rejection, disapproval or dissociation characteristic of ironies or denials, or a questioning attitude
characteristic of echo-questions – but also an attitude of endorsement of that first attitude, which was originally expressed and projected by the current hearer or some other individual. This attitude of endorsement combines with the first attitude expressed towards the facts, events, behaviours or states of affairs these utterances refer to. With that second attitude the speaker provides the hearer with evidence that not only some assumptions from which they can draw similar implications are or become manifest to them, but also that the very manifestness of those assumptions about particular facts, events, behaviours or states of affairs causes them a similar or the same attitude and that the speaker’s attitude is one of acceptance or endorsement of the hearer’s past, and probably current, attitude towards them.

5. Conclusion

This paper has argued that the relevance of the so-called attitudinal utterances may reside on some occasions in the expression of an attitude which is fundamental for the achievement of the effects of solidarity, rapport, reciprocity or association associated with these utterances. These effects can arise spontaneously, as a natural by-product of utterance comprehension, or can be sought on purpose by the speaker. Additionally, this paper has also discussed the mental processes that may take place in the hearer’s mind when processing attitudinal utterances for these effects to arise. In doing so, this paper has shown that the effects mentioned depend on the interlocutors’ metarepresentational abilities, their abilities to derive implications from assumptions already manifest to themselves and have intuitions about the implications that the other interlocutor can also derive.

This paper has also argued that, although some repeated or recurrent attitudinal utterances about facts, events, behaviours or states of affairs with which interlocutors are already acquainted may apparently seem irrelevant because they may make manifest assumptions that are previously manifest to the interlocutors (Žegarac 1998; Žegarac and Clark 1999), these utterances may also achieve an optimal level of relevance because of the feeling of solidarity, rapport, reciprocity or association that they can achieve. These feelings can be generated because the speaker attributes the manifestness of assumptions about some facts, events, behaviours or states of affairs that are also manifest to the hearer, metarepresents those assumptions and expresses an attitude of endorsement, agreement or acceptance that blends with another attitude that is also already manifest to both interlocutors. With that combination of attitudes
the speaker shows the hearer that she has the same positive or negative opinion about the content of her utterance, which is essential for the generation of the feelings attributed to indirect complaints. In turn, for the hearer to achieve the feelings mentioned, he has to check that the assumptions manifest to him are similar to those metarepresented by the speaker.

Nevertheless, in suggesting that these feelings can be achieved in the way explained here, it is not the aim of this paper to state that they are solely generated thus. As extensive research in social pragmatics has shown, the feelings of solidarity, rapport, reciprocity or association between interlocutors also depend on other social and/or psychological factors, such as the individuals’ frequency of contact, their degree of familiarity, the time they have known each other, the (reciprocal) positive or negative affect they feel towards each other, a certain feeling of like-mindedness when facing specific states of affairs, a possible feeling of comradeship, the social power one of them has over the other and the way s/he exerts it, or the relative degree of imposition that their actions have upon the other, among others (e.g. Brown and Levinson 1987; Spencer-Oatey 1993, 1996; Lorés Sanz 1997-1998). Therefore, the attribution of some attitudes and the combinations of attitudes referred to in this paper must be taken as some of the many (indispensable) factors that contribute to the generation of the feelings associated with attitudinal utterances.

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