ON THE SOCIAL IMPORTANCE OF PHATIC UTTERANCES: SOME CONSIDERATIONS FOR A RELEVANCE THEORETIC APPROACH

Manuel Padilla Cruz
University of Seville

Abstract

In this paper, I offer some guidelines to improve the extant Relevance Theoretic (RT henceforward) approach to phatic utterances, as developed by Žegarac (1998) and Žegarac and Clark (1999a). Following Sperber’s (1996) work on culture, Unger’s (2001) proposal on genre and Laver’s (1974/1975, 1981) study of phatic utterances, I argue that these utterances may achieve an optimal level of relevance because of the interaction of cultural metarepresentations about the relation between their use and the different politeness systems (Scollon & Scollon, 1983, 1995) interlocutors can establish. As a result of this, hearers may obtain contextual effects about their social relationship with their interlocutors, which results into a better appraisal of the social reality in which they interact.
1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to offer some ideas to improve the extant RT treatment of phatic communication. Therefore, I will start by introducing some of the basic theoretical postulates of the model developed by Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995). Then, I will review some of the issues of the approach to phatic utterances by Žegarac (1998) and Žegarac and Clark (1999a). After having done so, I will introduce the ideas on phatic utterances proposed by Laver (1974/1975, 1981), for the main argument of this paper is partially based on his findings about the connection between the use of these utterances and interlocutors’ social relationship. To conclude, I will summarise the proposal I am currently working in (Padilla Cruz, in preparation) about the way in which the RT approach to phatic utterances could be improved.

2. Relevance Theory and phatic utterances

2.1. A brief overview of Relevance Theory

RT (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995) is based on a definition of relevance and two general principles. On the one hand, a cognitive principle of relevance, which states that human cognition is geared to the maximisation of relevance. On the other hand, a communicative principle of relevance, according to which every utterance communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance, i.e. it creates expectations of relevance.

Relevance is treated as a property of utterances and is defined in terms of contextual effects and processing effort. Contextual effects result from the processing of new information in a context\(^1\) of assumptions selected from the

---

\(^1\) One of the most important contributions of RT (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995) is its view of context as set of assumptions the hearer selects as the on-line process of understanding takes
whole set of assumptions an individual has stored in his cognitive device. They can be of three types:

a) **Strengthening** of previously held assumptions.

b) **Contradiction** of assumptions, which can result into the deletion of possessed information.

c) **Contextual implications**, which is the new information derived only from the interaction of both old and newly received information.

The processing of new information requires some mental effort. This effort comes from the construction or selection of a context of assumptions in which to process information, or from the psychological complexity of utterances. Other things being equal, the more contextual effects the processing of an utterance produces, the more relevant it will be; and the more cognitive effort required to process it, the less relevant it will be. Therefore, the optimal relevance of an utterance lies on an adequate balance between processing effort and contextual effects.

According to Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995), when communicating, the speaker has an **informative intention**, which is her intention to make manifest a set of assumptions to the hearer. In addition, she also has a **communicative intention**, which is her intention to make manifest her informative intention. By means of an utterance, the speaker draws the addressee’s attention towards a set of assumptions she wants to make manifest, some of which are essential for a correct understanding of her utterance. Those assumptions can be communicated either explicitly or implicitly. In some circumstances, the addressee can determine the set of implicit assumptions in a very exact way because the speaker has made strongly manifest that she expects him to use them to process her utterance. However, in others, the addressee has to run the risk of determining it, since some of those assumptions are only weakly manifest. This is the basis for Sperber and Wilson’s (1986/1995) distinction between strong and weak communication. Weak communication might lead the hearer to use place. This contrasts with its traditional definitions, according to which it is given before the understanding process.
assumptions the speaker might not have intended or expected him to use, so that the responsibility of understanding cases of weak communication in a particular way lies heavily on the addressee’s selection of a context for interpretation.

As aforementioned, within the framework of RT (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995), Žegarac (1998) and Žegarac and Clark (1999a) have tried to give a satisfactory account of the interpretation of phatic utterances. Therefore, in the next section I will present a brief summary of their most important ideas. After that, I will also comment on some problems of their analysis of these utterances.

2.2. The extant RT approach to phatic utterances

Žegarac (1998) and Žegarac and Clark (1999a) have argued that utterances that are interpreted as phatic do not achieve a satisfactory level of relevance in both interlocutors’ mutual cognitive environment, because their propositional content does not yield enough contextual effects. As a consequence of the principle of relevance, what would have been expected and desirable is that the hearer obtained as many contextual effects that made the processing of those utterances relevant. This leads these authors to suggest that the optimal relevance of phatic utterances does not depend on their propositional content or on the speaker’s informative intention, because the assumptions those utterances make manifest are already manifest in the mutual cognitive environment of both interlocutors. Thus, Žegarac (1998: 336) states that the relevance of phatic utterances lies on the very act of ostension itself, or, in other words, on the fact that the speaker has spoken. This is tantamount to saying that the relevance of phatic utterances resides on the speaker’s communicative intention, since by means of a social behaviour, such as speaking, she provides the hearer with evidence that she has a social attitude towards him, although the content of such an attitude may not be specified.

To illustrate this, the author considers the following example in three possible imaginary situations:
(1) There’s a postal strike today.

Firstly, in a situation in which a couple is having breakfast, the speaker utters (1) and the hearer is waiting for a very important parcel that morning, the latter could obtain many different contextual effects from its propositional content, for it can give rise to many different contextual implications: e.g. that the parcel will not arrive, that he will have to wait for it until the next day, that there may be demonstrations on the streets, that the post-office may be close, etc. Obviously, these contextual implications will vary depending on the assumptions the utterance makes manifest or on the mental context the hearer selects.

Secondly, if that same couple is remembering a list of things they must do that day, it is rather unlikely that the hearer interprets (1) as a phatic token, as he can achieve contextual effects from its processing. Nevertheless, if in both interlocutors’ mutual cognitive environment it was actually mutually manifest that there would be a postal strike that day and the processing of the utterance does not strengthen any previous information, it is rather likely that the hearer interprets it as a phatic utterance. In this case, the hearer will interpret that the speaker’s intention when uttering it is simply to make manifest to him that she wants to talk to him, that she wants to maintain their interactive contact.

Finally, if (1) is produced one morning at breakfast after a serious argument – a consequence of which has been that both individuals have not talked to each other for days –, its propositional content might not cause contextual effects because the assumptions the utterance makes manifest are already manifest in the interlocutors’ mutual cognitive environment or they are totally unrelated to other manifest assumptions. In this case, the relevance of (1) will lie again on the speaker’s communicative intention, i.e. on the fact that he has spoken.

2.3. *Some problems of the RT approach to phatic utterances*
Although Žegarac (1998) and Žegarac and Clark’s (1999a) RT treatment of phatic utterances addresses other issues which will not be addressed in this paper, Ward and Horn (1999) have criticised that their view of phatic communication is very limited because it only considers a very specific type of utterances used to begin a conversation\(^2\). In addition to this, I also think that it reduces its social importance and functions just to the maintenance of the interactive contact between interlocutors. In my opinion, this point of view coincides with that of authors such as Coulmas (1981), Drazdauskienė (1982, 1995), Halliday (1973) or Jakobson (1960), who have seen in phatic communication a linguistic device to keep contact between interlocutors, or with the ideas expressed by Leech (1983), Lyons (1968) or Tannen (1984), according to whom participants use phatic utterances just to avoid silence, which can be experienced as something uncomfortable.

I also think that, underlying Žegarac (1998) and Žegarac and Clark’s (1999a) ideas about phatic utterances, there is a conception of a type of defective discourse that does not convey authentic information. This stems from Malinowski’s (1923) work on phatic communion, where the author argued that the meaning of phatic utterances is obvious and trivial. In our linguistic tradition, this viewpoint has been perpetuated through the writings of other authors, such as Abercrombie (1956, 1998).

Furthermore, the belief that discourse can be classified as authentically transactional or as purely interactional (e.g. Brown & Yule, 1983) may have influenced Žegarac (1998) and Žegarac and Clark’s (1999a) explanation. According to this, transactional discourse is discourse that follows the maxims and sub-maxims proposed by Grice (1975) for efficient and successful communication, since it has a clear and specific goal, a serious tone and an unavoidable compromise with truthfulness and clarity, and there is a real exchange of factual information that is worth having (Coupland, Coupland & Robinson, 1992: 210). On the opposite, phatic discourse has normally been identified with interactional discourse, as it foregrounds the

relational aspects of communication³.

However, as has been recently pointed out by some authors (e.g. Gómez Morón, 1998; Holmes, 2000), it is quite inconvenient to conceive discourse in this twofold way. Rather, it should be viewed as a continuum of cases ranging from an ideal extreme of purely transactional to another of purely interactional discourse. Between these two points, hybrid cases of both interactional and transactional discourse are to be found, since every manifestation of discourse must be understood as conveying simultaneously information about the relationship participants perceive, establish or want to create or change between them. This information does not differ from other factual information, since it can be mentally represented in the form of assumptions individuals can entertain.

Since the publication of Brown and Levinson’s (1978/1987) seminal work on politeness, it has been clear that speakers assess three distinct contextual variables when interacting: the relative power (P) the speaker has over the hearer, or vice versa; the social distance (D) existing between them, and the rank of imposition (I) an act involves⁴. In addition to these three factors intervening in communication, other authors (Brown & Gilman, 1989; Coupland, Grainger & Coupland, 1988; Garcés Conejos, 1993; Gómez Morón, 1997; Ide, 1989; Kopytko, 1995; Spencer-Oatey, 1993, 1996) have shown that the speaker has also to take into consideration another variable: the affect (A) that she feels towards the addressee or that he feels towards her. Therefore, I agree with these authors that, in addition to the propositional content of her message, by means of a phatic utterance the speaker may communicate implicitly, for instance, information about the power she has over the addressee or the addressee has over her, or about the social distance

³ See Padilla Cruz (in preparation) for a more detailed discussion.
⁴ Brown and Levinson (1978/1987) captured the idea that participants in a conversation assess these three variables when deciding whether to perform or avoid what they call a Face Threatening Act (FTA) in the following formula: \( Wx = D(S, H) + P(H, S) + Ix \), in which \( Wx \) refers to the weightiness a certain speech act involves in a particular situation.
between them.

Therefore, I think that phatic utterances would achieve an optimal level of relevance by making more or less strongly manifest different assumptions about the nature of the interlocutors’ social relationship, which the hearer will have to retrieve to achieve contextual effects that offset his processing of those utterances. In other words, phatic utterances would achieve an optimal level of relevance through the communication of strong or weak implicatures about the contextual variables intervening in interaction that the hearer will use to obtain contextual effects about the social relationship with his interlocutor. The evidence the hearer can rely on to retrieve those implicatures are his cognitive environment and the linguistic form and propositional content of the speaker’s utterance, for these are chosen after her having evaluated the aforementioned contextual variables. However, the problem that still needs to be solved is why and how the hearer can retrieve that social information.

In relation to this, I find Laver’s (1974/1975, 1981) ideas rather interesting, since he was maybe the first author to draw our attention to the social significance of phatic utterances in England and the United States. Therefore, in the following section I will review very briefly some of his contributions, as the proposal to improve the extant RT approach to phatic utterances I will present in this paper is based on them.


Laver’s (1974/1975, 1981) starting point was to state that phatic utterances are extremely important for participants for two main reasons.

---

5 In Padilla Cruz (in preparation), I term these contextual effects *social effects*, since they are related to the features of interlocutors’ social relation.

6 Remember that, according to Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 194), implicatures are both implicated premises and conclusions the speaker expects the hearer to use when interpreting utterances in order to obtain an optimal level of relevance.
Firstly, because they limit the topics participants can deal with in interaction, and, secondly, because they convey indexical information about the social relationship existing between them: “[...] the type of linguistic token chosen by a speaker may reflect his view of the social structuring of the interaction” (Laver, 1974/1975: 222). As a general principle, the author established that phatic utterances have deictic reference, for they can refer either to specific temporal or local elements of the situation in which they are produced, or to other factors intervening in their production which may be related to the speaker or to the addressee.

He distinguished a group of phatic utterances with neutral reference and another group with personal reference. Within the former group, Laver (1974/1975: 223) included those utterances referring or describing, for example, the weather or other features of the situation in which they are produced. Furthermore, he subdivided them according to their temporal reference, since they can refer to the past (2-4), the present (5-9) or the future (10-13):

(2) Terrible night, last night.
(3) Nasty smog yesterday.
(4) Great match last weekend.
(5) Nice day.
(6) Beautiful day.
(7) Nice party.
(8) Great view.
(9) The bus seems to be delayed.
(10) Going to clear up.
(11) Frost tonight.
(12) Snow’s coming.
(13) Heavy rain tomorrow.

On the other hand, the author subdivided the group of personal phatic utterances into two different subsets: self-oriented phatic utterances, i.e. utterances about the speaker (14-16), and other-oriented phatic utterances,
i.e. utterances about the hearer (17-19):

(14) Hot work this.
(15) My legs weren’t made for these hills.
(16) I do like a breath of fresh air.
(17) How’s life (business/things/the family/the wife, etc.)?
(18) How do you like the sunshine?
(19) That looks like hard work.
But, in my opinion, his most important contribution was to relate the usage of each type of phatic utterances in England and in the United States to the social relationship participants have. According to him, participants may have a relationship of solidarity or a relationship of non-solidarity, in which there can be a status difference between them. The solidarity relationship coincides with what some years later Scollon and Scollon (1983, 1995) called a solidarity politeness system, characterised by a low value of the variables power and social distance for both interlocutors. The non-solidarity relationship, however, can be matched to what Scollon and Scollon (1983, 1995) termed a hierarchical politeness system, if there is a difference between the interlocutors in terms of their relative power, or a deference politeness system, if there is social distance between them.

According to Laver, in a solidarity politeness system participants may select neutral or personal phatic tokens, no matter whether they are self-oriented or other-oriented. In a hierarchical politeness system, the speaker of a lower status may address the participant of a higher status by means of a self-oriented personal phatic token, whereas the participant of higher status may use other-oriented tokens. As Laver (1974/1975, 1981) notes, in this politeness system the convention seems to be that the individual of higher status is allowed to invade the inferior’s psychological space, while the individual of lower status cannot invade the superior’s. Finally, in a deference politeness system, the rule appears to be that participants should avoid personal utterances – though this should not mean that they might select them – and select neutral utterances.

However, if individuals do not follow these patterns and do not select their phatic utterances accordingly, Laver contends that the effects they can achieve are more complex: “[...] such contraventions have special significance for indexical attitudes about the status relationship between the two speakers, and sometimes about the solidarity factor of their relationship” (Laver, 1974/1975: 224). Firstly, in a hierarchical politeness system, when the individual of higher status addresses the inferior by means of a self-oriented phatic utterance, she is offering him a temporal relation of solidarity in which the status difference is cancelled. However, when the individual of
lower status addresses the superior by means of an other-oriented token, he may think that she is invading his psychological space without his previous permission to do so, i.e. that she does not care about the status difference. Secondly, in a deference politeness system, if the speaker uses a self-oriented phatic utterance, she is momentarily inviting the hearer to establish a solidarity relationship, whereas if she uses an other-oriented token, she may be interpreted as if forcing the hearer to establish that solidarity relationship.

As has been seen in this section, Laver (1974/1975, 1981) has shown that the different types of phatic utterances are used depending on the social relationship participants perceive, as well as the effects they can achieve by means of their violations of the conventions he observed in England and the United States. It is interesting that in non-solidarity relationships phatic utterances are aimed at reinforcing the status differences between participants, whereas the usage of the ‘forbidden’ option is aimed at reducing those status differences and increasing the level of solidarity between them. As aforesaid, I find Laver’s (1974/1975, 1981) work on phatic utterances rather illuminating for an improvement of the present RT approach to phatic utterances, as it points towards the existence of some conventions of usage of phatic utterances that members of very specific socio-cultural groups seem to follow systematically. These patterns would allow them to recover some communicative effects that can determine their perception of the social reality in which they interact. Since I consider this idea rather important for social interaction, I will elaborate on it in the next section.

4. Towards a new RT approach to phatic utterances

As will be remembered, Žegarac (1998) and Žegarac and Clark (1999a) originally proposed that phatic utterances do not achieve an optimal level of relevance through their propositional content, because it refers to something that is already manifest in both interlocutors’ mutual cognitive environment. According to these authors, phatic utterances achieve an optimal level of relevance through the fact that the speaker has spoken, or, which is the same,
through making manifest that the speaker has a communicative intention. However, as shown by Laver (1974/1975, 1981), the orientation of phatic utterances – i.e. whether they are neutral, self-oriented or other-oriented – plays a crucial role in social interaction because it helps interlocutors determine, confirm their previous expectations about or retrieve contextual implications about the politeness system in which they are interacting. In order to select a specific phatic utterance, the speaker must assess the relative power she has over the hearer or the social distance between them⁷. Therefore, I think that, when the speaker uses a phatic utterance, she may make more or less manifest to the hearer assumptions about the power and/or social distance existing between them. In turn, the hearer can recover this information as weak or strong implicatures, depending on the strength with which the speaker communicates those assumptions. Thus, by means of inferences, he can determine the type of relationship the speaker wants to establish, maintain or modify with him.

But, from my point of view, for the hearer to carry out specific inferences about the politeness system in which the speaker and he are interacting, he will need to resort to some cultural knowledge about the kind of phatic utterances used and the contextual effects he may obtain from them. This cultural knowledge may contain information similar to the patterns described by Laver (1974/1975, 1981), mentally represented as any other factual assumption or, as Sperber (1996) suggests, as cultural metarepresentations.

According to this author, these metarepresentations are widely distributed and inhabit the minds of the individuals belonging to certain

⁷ For the sake of simplicity, in this work I have preferred to follow Scollon and Scollon’s (1983, 1995) politeness systems, determined as a result of interlocutors’ evaluation of the contextual variables power and social distance. However, in Padilla Cruz (in preparation), I have modified their three initial politeness systems as a consequence interlocutors’ assessment of a further variable: affect, as proposed, by Brown and Gilman (1989), Coupland, Grainger and Coupland (1988), Garcés Conejos (1993), Gómez Morón (1997), Ide (1989), Kopytko (1995) or Spencer-Oatey (1993, 1996).
cultural groups, thanks to an epidemiologic process of contagion, by means
of which they are transmitted and end up stabilising in those individuals’
knowledge of particular aspects of the reality surrounding them. The reason
why this is so is that those individuals must find them very useful for
establishing the relevance of certain stimuli they have to process. As an
immediate consequence of this, those metarepresentations are strengthened
and access to them becomes much easier. This suggests that they may be
straightforwardly accessed when individuals need to process further similar
stimuli. Then, as Sperber (1996) puts it, the more a (set of) cultural
metarepresentation(s) is productive in terms of the processing of certain types
of ostensive stimuli, the more beneficial it will be for the members of a
cultural group to share it/them. Obviously, the most effective way to get
those metarepresentations is to communicate them, for, by means of
communication, they are spread through that group with slight modifications
in their content, but not reduplicated. Therefore, cultural knowledge is
information that is relatively easy to access because of the role it plays in the
processing of different kinds of inputs, which, at the same time, means that it
is information that contributes satisfactorily to the search for the relevance of
those inputs.

As will be remembered, the cognitive principle of relevance states that
human cognition is geared towards the maximisation of relevance, whereas
the communicative principle of relevance establishes that every utterance
communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance, i.e. it creates
expectations of relevance in the hearer (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995). As
any other act of ostensive behaviour, a phatic utterance alters the hearer’s
cognitive environment by making manifest a set of assumptions that
constitute the speaker’s informative intention, and draws his attention
towards that set of assumptions. On the one hand, its processing will require
from the hearer a certain amount of cognitive effort that will have to be offset
by obtaining as many contextual effects as possible in order for him to
achieve an optimal level of relevance that satisfies his expectations of
relevance. On the other hand, the speaker will try to achieve that optimal
level of relevance by means of a phatic utterance only if she chooses the
utterance whose processing yields as many contextual effects as can produce
an adequate balance with the cognitive effort the hearer will have to invest to
obtain them. But, moreover, with a phatic utterance the speaker will not only
be interested in making manifest assumptions that are already manifest in the
hearer’s cognitive environment, as Žegarac (1998) and Žegarac and Clark
(1999a) contended, if she is really aiming for optimal relevance. In my
opinion, the speaker may intend that the hearer obtains some contextual
effects about the politeness system in which both are interacting, so she may
rely on the fact that the hearer will use his cultural knowledge about the
usage of phatic utterances and the effects he can derive from this in some
communicative situations in order to obtain them.

In a nutshell, I would like to follow Unger’s (2001) proposal about the
role of genre information in interpretation and argue in this paper that
interlocutors’ cultural knowledge about the usage of phatic utterances in
social interaction may contribute drastically to the generation of very firm
and specific expectations of relevance in the hearer about the way in which
the speaker aims at achieving an optimal level of relevance with these
utterances. In my opinion, the hearer’s expectations of relevance can be
focused on the type of phatic utterances – neutral or personal –, their content,
and their relation to the existence of one or other kind of politeness system.
Thus, as I have explained above, the speaker has access to cultural
metarepresentations about the different politeness systems she can establish,
as well as about the types and content of the phatic utterances she can resort
to in order to establish or modify them. Similarly, the hearer will access that
cultural information, which, in his case, adjusts his expectations of relevance
regarding the contextual effects he can obtain from the processing of these
utterances. Therefore, following Unger (2001), I also think that that cultural
information about phatic utterances ‘feeds’ the hearer’s interpretation

---

8 According to this author, information about different genre is, basically, cultural
information that enters the interpretation process, fine-tuning the hearer or reader’s
expectations of relevance and providing him with assumptions that condition his
understanding of certain types of discourse.
processes providing him with assumptions that will allow him to perform inferences that may result into his deduction of the politeness system in which the speaker and he are interacting. As a consequence of the interaction between that cultural information and the assumptions made strongly or weakly manifest by phatic utterances, these utterances may achieve an optimal level of relevance thanks to the derivation of contextual effects about the politeness system interlocutors perceive, which is rather important for social interaction.

The *relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure* (Wilson, 1999) directs the hearer to test the presumption of optimal relevance communicated by a phatic utterance verifying whether its most easily-accessible interpretation achieves a level of relevance that satisfies his own expectations of relevance, i.e. permits him to obtain as many contextual effects that offset the cognitive effort he has to invest. In order to do so, he will follow the path that requires the least cognitive effort possible and will expand his interpretive context in different directions. In each expansion of his mental context, he may also include cultural metarepresentations about phatic utterances and the effects that can be obtained with them. When he arrives at an interpretation that satisfies those expectations of relevance using that cultural information, his interpretive process will stop, for he will have found the most relevant interpretation of that utterance that he can think of at that moment. For this reason, I consider that it can be concluded that the vast amount of cultural metarepresentations interlocutors may store about certain aspects of specific kinds of utterances, such as their content, type, relation to some politeness systems, etc., determines greatly the way in which those utterances can achieve an optimal level of relevance, as they enter the inferential processes that take place in comprehension and favour the hearer’s obtaining of some contextual effects that contribute to a better appraisal of the social milieu in which he is interacting.

---

9 See Padilla Cruz (in preparation) for some examples and more detail explanations on this.
5. Conclusion

In this paper I have argued from the framework of RT (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995) that the social importance of phatic utterances resides in the interlocutors’ usage of some cultural metarepresentations regarding the connection between these utterances and specific politeness systems, which condition the speaker’s use of these utterances in accordance with some patterns captured by them and enable the hearer to perform inferences that result into contextual effects about the social relationship both individuals perceive. Nevertheless, there are other aspects of phatic utterances that pose many questions and, therefore, still need some consideration from a pragmatic perspective, such as how and whether all hearers can obtain those contextual effects, or the influence of cultural knowledge about these utterances on interlocutors’ evaluation of the (im)politeness of their linguistic behaviour. To some of them, I am now trying to give an answer (Padilla Cruz, in preparation).

6. References


in A.H. Jucker (ed.). Historical Pragmatics: Pragmatic Developments in
Laver, J. 1974. Communicative Functions of Phatic Communion. Work in
Progress 7: 1-17.
Kendon, R.M. Harris & M.R. Key (eds.). Organisation of Behaviour in
in F. Coulmas (ed.). Conversational Routine. Explorations in
Standardized Communication Situations and Prepatterned Speech. The
University Press.
Malinowski, B. 1923. “The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages”, in
C.K. Ogden & I.A. Richards (eds.). The Meaning of Meaning. A Study of
the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of
Padilla Cruz, M. In preparation. Aproximación pragmática a los enunciados
Scollon, R. & Scollon, S.W. 1983. “Face in Interethnic Communication”, in
London: Longman, 156-190.
Scollon, R. & Scollon, S.W. 1995. Intercultural Communication. A
Spencer-Oatey, H.D. 1996. Reconsidering Power and Distance. Journal of
Blackwell.